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An Experimental Analysis of the Risk-Trust
Confound
Abstract
The notion of trust has great significance to an economy. Trust is known to be associated
with efficient judicial systems, improved government functioning with lower corruption, and
better financial outcomes (Johnson and Mislin, 2011). However, many researchers have argued
that risk attitudes may confound the measurement of trust because trusting decisions involve
outcomes that have only some probability of occurring. This study therefore seeks to question
whether risk attitudes predict trusting decisions in the Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)
Investment Game amongst students at the University of Cape Town in 2016. The statistical
method adopted is maximum likelihood estimation which accounts for subject errors in decision
making. This study finds that having additional information on the past behaviour of trustees
does not affect the trusting behaviour of trustors. In addition, the presence of a human trustee,
versus a computer, is found to significantly influence behaviour and decisions made by trustors
in the trust game. It is also found that subjects are, on average, risk averse with 62% of
subjects exhibiting high levels of risk aversion, and females being more risk averse than males.
Subjects were also found to subjectively distort probabilities, where subjects would overweight
low probabilities and underweight moderate to high probabilities. Expected Utility models and
Rank-Dependent Utility models show that risk and trust are statistically significantly related
and that the reasons for trusting one’s partner may have arisen out of an inner need to simply
trust that person. In addition, risk preferences were able to predict trusting decisions in the
environment of risk and the environment of trust. Risk and trust therefore go hand-in-hand
and it can be argued that trusting decisions are perceived as decisions involving risk. This
study therefore finds that trusting decisions are in fact confounded by risk attitudes, so that a
subject may be seen as trusting when actually they are just risk-seeking, or seen as non-trusting
when they are just simply risk averse.
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1 Introduction
The act of trusting another person involves putting oneself in an exposed situation and making
oneself vulnerable to another person’s actions. Specifically, Fukuyama (1995) defines this act as “the
expectation . . . of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms”,
which he believes leads to improved cooperative behaviour and hence, a better society. The potential
vulnerability and exploitation involved in trusting another person suggests a certain level of riskiness
when one decides whether to trust or not. Eckel and Wilson state that the decision to trust is similar
to “placing a risky bet on the trustworthiness of an anonymous counterpart” (2004, 447). They go
on to explain that trusting can involve a person giving up their assets to another, but that it is not
guaranteed that this asset will ever be returned to them.
This level of uncertainty, where a person’s decisions can be affected by the outcome of someone
else’s, means, as explained by Houser, Schunk, and Winter (2010) [henceforth, HSW], that trusting
decisions occur in an environment of strategic uncertainty. On the other hand, risky decisions are
made in an environment of state uncertainty and depend on probabilities, the outcomes of which
tend to be outside the control of the individual. There is therefore perfect information concerning
the probability of possible outcomes with respect to risky decisions, and imperfect information over
the probability of someone else’s decisions with respect to trusting decisions.
Attitudes toward risk are important factors to consider when making inferences about trust. An
individual may appear to be more trusting because he or she actually trusts more or it may be
because he or she is more willing to take a risk or a gamble. For different levels of trust across two
communities, to what extent is that difference driven by varying levels of risk aversion? For example,
suppose two different individuals trust the same amount of money to another person. Does this
necessarily mean that they both have the same level of trust? Or could one individual be more
inherently trusting than the other, but their greater level of risk aversion tempers any urge that
they might have to send more money?
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Eckel and Wilson (2004) explain that risk preferences may not be the only factor determining an
individual’s decision to trust. Other factors include social distance and knowledge of one’s partner,
since anonymity of that partner may increase the riskiness of a trusting decision. Cook and Cooper
(2003) describe an individual’s decision to trust as him or her deciding whether or not to take a risk
on another person. Ben-Ner and Putterman (2001) explain that trust depends on an individual’s
past experience with trusting another person, their personal preferences, and his or her willingness
to take a risk. Risk preferences may therefore influence the decision to trust.
In addition, individuals can form subjective probability judgements over outcomes in a trust en-
vironment. Choices made may then depend on the extent to which people over- or underweight
probabilities. For example, suppose that there is a small chance of a subject receiving a bad outcome
when making a trusting decision. If this subject overweights the likelihood of the bad outcome, then
he or she may perceive a greater chance of receiving that bad outcome than is objectively true and
hence be less willing to trust; the opposite holds if the subject underweights this probability.
This study aims to investigate whether or not risk and trust are related and whether subjects
subjectively distort probabilities when making choices under risk. It has been argued that trust and
risk are very closely related: specifically, risk attitudes may affect whether an individual chooses to
trust, and to what degree. To the extent that this is true, there is the risk-trust confound.
Section 2 below details the literature on the risk-trust confound. Section 3 outlines the experimental
design. A detailed description of the statistical analysis follows in Section 4. Section 5 provides the
results and section 6 a discussion of these results. Lastly, Section 7 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
The risk-trust confound has been researched by various authors such as Eckel and Wilson (2004),
Schechter (2007), and HSW, to name a few. All of these studies investigated whether trust measure-
ments were correlated with risk measurements.
A commonly-used way to measure trust in an experimental setting, and an instrument used by all of
the above, is the Investment Game1 of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) [BDM]. In this game,
two anonymous players are paired together. Both players in each pair receive an endowment of $10.
The first player (the trustor) has to decide how much of this $10 to send to his or her partner: all,
none, or any integer amount. The amount sent is then tripled before being received by their partner.
This partner, the second player (the trustee), then has the option of sending back all, none, or any
integer amount of the tripled amount. Decisions made by each player can be interpreted as acts of
trust and trustworthiness respectively: Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov (2006) label the amount sent
by the first player as trust, and the amount returned by the second player as a proportion of what
he or she was initially sent, as trustworthiness. Berg et al. (1995, 127) explain that “sending $1 may
signal a very weak belief in reciprocity; at the other extreme, sending $10 may signal a strong belief
in reciprocity”.
BDM state the payoffs of each player to be as follows: Player 1 earns their initial $10 minus the
amount that he or she decides to send to Player 2, plus the amount that Player 2 decides to return to
him or her; Player 2 earns $10 plus the tripled amount that he or she receives minus the amount that
he or she decides to send back to Player 1. Taking this into account, they explain that if subjects
have a strictly increasing indirect utility function for wealth and want to maximise this, then second
players will have a dominant strategy to keep the entire tripled amount that they receive. Thus, if
first players predict such an action by their partner, then they would initially choose to send nothing.
This, BDM acknowledge, is the subgame perfect equilibrium of this strategic interaction.
1The Investment Game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) is now commonly referred to as the Trust Game
and will be referred to as such henceforth.
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The above-mentioned researchers have argued that risk attitudes may confound this measure of
trust derived from the trust game because trusting decisions involve outcomes that have only some
probability of occurring. Most of the research surrounding the risk-trust confound makes use of this
trust game and varying measures of risk attitudes.
Specifically, Eckel and Wilson (2004) (row 2 of Table 1) made use of a modified trust game, which
gave the trustor the binary option of sending all of their $10 endowment or none of it. The roles of
trustor and trustee were randomly assigned to two paired individuals in different locations. Both
players in each pair were also asked to predict the decisions of their partner and were asked what
kind of situation this game reminded them of, to explore whether subjects thought of the interaction
as an act of trust.
They then elicited risk attitudes using three measures. The first is the Zuckerman Sensation-Seeking
Scale which measured each subject’s willingness to partake in risky activities using a 40 question
survey. The second is the Holt and Laury (2002) [HL] risk preference task which asked subjects to
indicate their preferred option (A or B) for ten pairs of lotteries. Both options A and B in each lottery
contained a high payoff and a low payoff. Option B’s payoffs had greater variance than payoffs under
Option A, and as a result made B the riskier choice. The probability of receiving the greater payoff
in both options increased for each successive lottery choice. So a risk neutral subject would initially
choose the safer option A and only switch over to the riskier option B when the expected value of B
exceeds that of A. The third risk measurement was a card gamble, where subjects had the option of
choosing $10 with certainty or taking the gamble, where the latter had probabilities designed to repli-
cate the return distribution of the trust game. The gamble had earnings between $0 and $20, with
an expected value of $10. Each of these three tasks were played in a fixed order throughout all sessions.
The experimental design of Eckel and Wilson (2004) had subjects divided into three treatments,
each of which received differing amounts of information about their partner: treatment 1 received
no information; treatment 2 received information on their partner’s gender, favourite colour, interest
in movies, and whether they liked dogs; and treatment 3 received a photograph of their partner.
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Eckel and Wilson (2004) used, as dependent variables, three risk measurements: the Zuckerman
Sensation-Seeking Scale, the HL risk task, and the card gamble. These risk regressions had demo-
graphic explanatory variables aimed at extracting the determinants of risky choice. They modelled
the decision to trust using a Probit model in an attempt to find the determinants of trust. To
investigate the relationship between trust and risk, they evaluated the correlation coefficient of each
risk measurement with the decision to trust, in each treatment and in the sample as a whole.
They found no correlation between risk preferences and trusting decisions, and “little evidence that
trust is related to survey or decision measures of general risk aversion” (Eckel and Wilson, 2004,
463). However, since there was no control for order effects, it may be difficult to disentangle risk
effects on trust from possible order effects. One important finding is that the card gamble and the
HL task were found not to be statistically significantly related to trust. The third measure, the
Zuckerman Sensation-Seeking Scale, only became significant once expected returns were included in
the model. However, Eckel and Wilson (2004, 464) explain that this model with expectations and
beliefs could just “be a post hoc justification for the decision to trust”. Another important finding is
that the HL risk task, which was unable to predict trusting decisions, was also unable to predict
decisions in a standard risk environment: namely, the “Thrill and Adventure Seeking” subscale of
the Zuckerman Sensation-Seeking Scale that most resembled a gamble. Therefore, the HL measure
of risk could not predict risky decisions in a purely risky environment.
Looking at the risk measurements, one might expect statistically significant correlations across
measures for a single subject. However, no such correlations were found, with the exception of a
positive and statistically significant correlation between the Zuckerman Sensation-Seeking Scale and
the HL measure. The remaining weak correlations could be due to the fact that unincentivised tasks
were used, so subjects had little motivation to provide accurate answers2.
2This observation does not dismiss the Zuckerman Sensation-Seeking Scale measure but simply questions the
measure in this particular experimental study.
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Another issue concerning their design is the fact that the modified trust game gives subjects the
option of sending all or none of their initial endowment. Using such a binary variable, as opposed
to a continuous one, essentially limits the amount of information that could be extracted from the
experiment and dilutes statistical power. It was also found that 38% of individuals participating in
this experiment did not actually believe, and hence trust, that they were paired with a real human
person (Eckel and Wilson, 2004). There was therefore a very low level of trust present in subjects
participating in an experiment seeking to measure and analyse trust.
In another research study conducted in rural Paraguay, Schechter (2007) (see last row of Table 1)
measured trust using the BDM trust game, but each subject now played the role of both the trustor
and the trustee. When playing as trustors, subjects were asked how much of their endowment of
8000 Guaranies (the national currency of Paraguay) they would like to send to trustees, but these
amounts were restricted to multiples of 2000, i.e. 0, 2000, 4000, . . . . As was done in the original
trust game of BDM, amounts sent by trustors were tripled and received by trustees. In addition,
subjects provided expectations using the strategy method3 and indicated how much they would
return for each possible amount that they could potentially receive.
Risk was measured using a risky gamble, designed to yield similar returns to those from trust games
played in a previous game in rural Zimbabwe (Barr, 2003). The game involved giving each individual
a fixed sum of money, again 8000 Guaranies, and allowing them to invest certain amounts of it in a
risky gamble. The outcome of the investment, and hence players’ payoffs, depended on the outcome
of a roll of a die. These amounts replicated those that could be sent in the trust game, which was
always played after the risk task. On completion of the risk task, players were given an IOU for
their risk task winnings. Once they had completed both the trust game and the risk task, they were
paid their total earnings in cash.
3 The strategy method is where players indicate contingent decisions for all possible outcomes of play (Brandts
and Charness, 2009). In this case, second players (trustees) indicated the amount that he or she would send back for
every possible amount that he or she could potentially receive from first players (trustors) (Sapienza, Toldra, and
Zingales, 2007). In Schechter (2007), trustees were asked how much they would send back to the trustor, given each
of the four tripled amounts (0, 6000, 120000, 24000) that they could receive.
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Schechter (2007) performed an OLS regression analysis with the following dependent variables: the
amount bet in the risk task, the amount sent in the trust game with no control for the bet amount,
and the amount sent with the control. Thereafter, additional controls were included to account
for altruism and reciprocity. These occurred in the form of the following proxies: the share of
money returned when playing the role of trustee, the average share returned by all trustees, the
log of gifts in the form of farm production given to family and friends, and the log of donations
in the form of time or money. It was found that altruism had little influence on the relationship
between trust and risk. A more important finding was that increases in the amount bet by a subject
in the risk task went hand-in-hand with increases in the amount that he or she sent in the trust game.
To distinguish between trust and risk, Schechter (2007) re-ran the OLS regressions with the following
interaction variables: bet size and gender, bet size and education, and lastly, bet size and main
language. However, the power of these tests was quite low which places limitations on conclusions
that can be drawn from this analysis. On the whole, Schechter (2007) found that decisions made in
the trust game do in fact depend on individuals’ risk preferences, regardless of any other variables
being added to the model.
There are two issues, however, that arise with Schechter’s design. Firstly, there is the potential for
order effects, since the risk task was always played prior to the trust game and it may have led
subjects to frame the trust game as a gamble too. A second potential issue is wealth effects, which
can be described as the effect on an individual’s behaviour as a result of changes to one’s level of
wealth (Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2005). This occurs here as subjects knew how much they had
earned in the initial risk task before starting the trust game, and this could potentially influence
decisions made in the latter. These issues make Schechter’s conclusion that “Risk aversion plays an
important role in determining play in the trust game” an uncertain one (2007, 284).
A third study was done by HSW (see row 4 of Table 1). Their approach involves “combining measures
of individual risk attitudes with individual decisions in investment games that do and do not include
a ‘trust’ component” (HSW, 2010, 4-5). They used two measurements and varied the order in which
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subjects completed each of them. The first measure is the BDM trust game for the trust component,
where trustors were given the option of sending any amount of their endowment to their paired trustee.
Again, the amount sent was tripled and received by trustees who then had the option of sending any
amount back. The other measure is the HL risk task for the risk component. This measure was
again a set of ten pairs of lottery choices for which subjects indicated their preferred choice between
options A and B. However, the outcomes of each of the ten lotteries were reduced to form one scalar
measure giving the number of safe choices that each subject made. HSW then divided this into three
further scalar measures according to the various levels of risk: risk averse, risk neutral and risk seeking.
The experimental design of HSW divides the trust game into 4 treatments to create two trust
treatments and two risk treatments. The trust treatments (Trust-1 and Trust-2) make use of human
trustees in the trust game. The risk treatments (Risk-1 and Risk-2) make use of computer trustees
in the trust game. Specifically, Trust-1 includes a standard trust game and no additional information
is provided to subjects. Trust-2 also involves a standard trust game but with the addition of
information in the form of past returns made by trustees in previous games run by BDM. In Risk-1,
the computer plays the trust game in the role of trustee and additional information is again provided
to trustors. Lastly, Risk-2 does have a human trustee but this individual does not make a decision
in the trust game. Instead, the computer responds on his or her behalf. Once again, information on
past returns was presented to trustors. A breakdown of these four treatments can be seen in Table 2
in the Experimental Design section.
In the two risk treatments, Risk-1 and Risk-2, the computer made a trustee decision, either in
the absence of a trustee or on behalf of one. Trustors in these treatments were presented with a
graph depicting the true return distribution of the computer. This information came from BDM
and subjects were informed that the data were from past experiments using human players. An
important difference between the four treatments is that in Risk-1 there is no human receiver and in
Risk-2 the computer will make a decision on behalf of a passive receiver who will earn what the
computer earns.
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HSW ran this type of comparison to search for the existence of prosocial motivations, which lead
individuals to act in a way that would benefit others. A comparison between the two risk treatments
therefore provides a control for prosocial impulses that could potentially affect trusting decisions.
This type of control helps to determine whether subjects appear more trusting because they are
more trusting or because they are fulfilling a need to be kind to another person. Ashraf et al. (2006)
explains that an individual may choose to trust another person because they enjoy trusting or
because they enjoy being kind to other people and displaying unconditional kindness.
In addition, trustors in both risk treatments are supplied with information on past returns made
by trustees in previous games played.4 Comparing this to their trust treatments where only one
of the two treatments are given this information, allows the study to account for differences in
information conditions between treatments. BDM explain that subjects who did not have any
additional information about their partner would fail to realise that partner’s dominant strategy to
keep all the money that he or she receives. They go on to say that having this information would
therefore make first players more aware of this option and steer them towards choosing the subgame
perfect equilibrium mentioned earlier, which is to not trust at all. On the other hand, the additional
information provided could instead lead subjects to trust their partner more than they otherwise
would have. Controlling for informational differences will therefore allow for such comparisons to be
made.
The overall experimental design by HSW is powerful and effective and will therefore be replicated
in this study aiming to differentiate risk from trust. The design is immune to order effects and
controls were in place for informational differences and prosocial motivations. In addition, the design
accounts for the issue of state vs strategic uncertainty mentioned earlier: specifically, decisions
made in treatments Trust-1 and Trust-2 are made in an environment of trust, and hence strategic
uncertainty, since both treatments involve the trustor playing against a human trustee; and decisions
made in Risk-1 and Risk-2 are made in an environment of risk, or state uncertainty, since trustors
play against a computer that responds according to a fixed distribution.
4 Past returns information come from previous games conducted by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).
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With these measures, their statistical analysis involved pooling the data and using a probit model
with the dependent variable of whether to invest or not. They also conducted a probit analysis on the
restricted sample of individuals who chose to invest a positive amount, with the dependent variable
being the decision to invest 4 or more experimental currency units. Mean amounts sent in the trust
game in trust treatments did not vary with risk attitudes but in the risk treatments, the mean amounts
sent increased as risk moved from risk averse to risk seeking, i.e. risk seeking individuals were more
inclined to invest higher amounts in the risk treatments. Participation in risk tasks also increased as
individuals became more risk tolerant. In addition, they found that decisions made in the two trust
treatments with human partners differed significantly to decisions made in the risk treatments with
computer partners: the trust treatments had subjects usually deciding to send zero or all of their
endowment while the risk treatment had subjects usually wanting to send half. Making a decision to
send money in an environment of trust with another human being, was therefore much more volatile
and uncertain than making the same decision in an environment of risk with no other person involved.
Besides Eckel and Wilson (2004), HSW, and Schechter (2007), there were other studies that in-
vestigated the risk-trust confound. The first of these is Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov (2006) who
found that risk had no significant effect on trusting decisions. Ashraf et al. (2006) (first row of the
literature review table) measured trust using the BDM trust game as well as the Dictator Game5
and the Triple Dictator Game6. Risk was measured using 6 risky choice tasks where subjects had to
indicate for each whether they preferred the gamble or the certain amount. Ashraf et al. (2006)
analysed the data using multivariate regressions for the amount sent with controls for expectation of
returns, unconditional kindness and risk preferences.
Evans and Krueger (2011) found that risk attitudes do affect an individual’s decision to trust. They
measured trust using the BDM trust game where subjects played the role of trustor and the role of
trustee was simulated. They measured risk using relative contributions of cost (the cost of trusting
5 Dictator Game is where the subject plays the role of dictator, with the option of sending any amount of their
endowment to a partner (Ashraf et al., 2006).
6 The Triple Dictator Game is identical to the standard dictator game except that the amount sent to the recipient
is tripled.
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but being betrayed) and benefit (the benefit from that trustee reciprocating trust). Cost and benefit
are considered to be two elements of potential payoffs when the first player exhibits trust, which was
manipulated by Evans and Krueger (2011) to form a single index of risk7. This index could either
be high or low. They found that low risk was conducive to trust. However, the fact that this was an
unincentivised experiment with hypothetical payoffs and that the generated risk index may not have
sufficiently captured risk preferences, leads one to question these findings.
A summary of the above-mentioned literature on the risk-trust confound can be found in Table 1
below. Four of the studies made use of the standard BDM trust game whilst the remaining three
studies made use of modified versions of the game. Most of the literature made use of the HL
risk task (4 occurrences) or involved placing a bet; the exception being Evans and Krueger (2011)
who combined the cost associated with trusting but being betrayed, and the benefit from trusting
and having that trust be reciprocated, into a single risk index. One other risk measure was the
Zuckerman Sensation-Seeking Scale used by Eckel and Wilson (2004, 2006). All of the studies were
incentivised, except for Evans and Krueger (2011) who made use of hypothetical stakes. Three
studies found a significant relationship between risk and trust, while two studies found none. These
opposing views on the risk-trust confound therefore suggests that further research on this topic is
required. This paper will thus explore this issue further.
7 If the trustor chooses not to trust, the game comes to an end. If, however, the trustor chooses to trust, the
game moves into a second stage and the trustee has to choose between reciprocity and betrayal. Evans and Krueger
(2011) state that payoffs in the trust game when the first player chooses to trust depends on three elements: cost,
benefit and temptation. They explain that the first two elements correspond to a subject’s vulnerability whilst the
third corresponds to expectations and the temptation for a trustee to defect. They define a trustor’s cost as the
difference in outcomes between being betrayed and having decided not trust. They define a trustor’s benefit as the
difference in outcomes between the trustee reciprocating trust and the trustor choosing not to trust at all. Risk was
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Notes to Table 1:
1Amount sent and multiplication imposed by experimenter in Trust Game.
2BDM TG: Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) Trust Game.
3Dictator Game: subject plays the role of dictator who has the option of sending any amount of their endowment to a partner (Ashraf et al., 2006).
4Triple Dictator: identical to standard dictator game except that the amount sent by the dictator to the recipient is tripled (Ashraf et al., 2006).
5Experimental currency units.
6Modified Trust Game differs from BDM in 3 ways: trustors can only send all or nothing; amount sent is doubled; and the decision is framed as a loan.
7ZSSS: Zuckerman Sensation-seeking scale.
8HL: Holt & Laury Risk Task (2002).
9Trustor roles only; trustee roles simulated. Each round had varying payoffs (5, 10, 15, 20).
10Each subject played the role of sender and then receiver. Senders also stated how much they expected would be returned to them using the Strategy Method.
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3 Experimental Design
3.1 Trust Elicitation Method
To elicit trusting decisions, the subjects played the trust game by BDM. All subjects, both trustor
(player 1) and trustee (player 2), received an initial endowment of R100. Trustors played first and
could send any positive integer amount (R0, R1, R2, . . . ) of their endowment to their randomly
assigned partner, the trustee. This amount was then tripled by the experimenter before being
received by the trustee. The trustee could then send any integer amount back to the same trustor,
which ranged from zero to the tripled amount. Trust was measured according to how much the trustor
chose to send to the trustee. This marked the end of the trust task, which will be referred to as Task T.
Task T is a replication of HSW who used four trust treatments as part of their experimental design.
Details on these treatments are provided below and a condensed overview is given thereafter in Table 2.
1. Task T: Treatment 1
Two players were randomly paired to play the standard BDM trust game (discussed above). Players
did not know who their partner was. No information was given to subjects about past return
distributions, i.e. amounts sent by second players back to first players.
2. Task T: Treatment 2
Two players were again randomly and anonymously assigned to each other to play the same trust
game. However, now players were shown return distributions made by subjects in the original BDM
study, thereby keeping to the experimental design of HSW. A graph appeared on-screen to show
trustors how trustees behaved in the previous BDM study. The graph shown to subjects can be
found in the appendix (Figure A1).
3. Task T: Treatm.ent 3
In this treatment there was no second player (i.e., no trustee), so every participant assumed the role
of trustor. The trustor decided how much to send and the computer determined the trustor’s earnings
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on the basis of the return distribution in BDM. The trustor was shown the return distributions from
BDM before he or she made a choice.
4. Task T: Treatment 4
This treatment is the same as above, except that there was now a second player (i.e., a trustee)
but this player was passive in the sense that he or she did not make a decision. Specifically, after
the trustor decided how much to send, this amount was received by the trustee but the computer
determined the trustor’s earnings on the basis of the return distribution in BDM. So the trustor and
trustee earned according to the trustor’s decision and the computer’s decision on behalf of the trustee.
Once again, the trustor was shown the return distributions from BDM before he or she made a choice.
An important difference between these last two treatments is that in treatment 3 there was no
human receiver (the computer made the player 2 decision). In treatment 4, the computer made a
decision on behalf of a passive receiver (the computer again made the player 2 decision but a human
player 2 received whatever the computer had earned).
Table 2: Breakdown of Experimental Treatments
Treatments in study Treatments in HSW1 Trustor Trustee Receiver Information2
Treatment 1 [T1] Trust-1 Human Human Human No
Treatment 2 [T2] Trust-2 Human Human Human Yes
Treatment 3 [T3] Risk-1 Human Computer N/A Yes
Treatment 4 [T4] Risk-2 Human Computer Human Yes
Notes: 1Treatments come from research study by Houser, Schunk, and Winter (2010).
2Information provided in the form of a histogram showing past return distributions made by trustees in
previous runs of the BDM trust game.
16
3.2 Risk Elicitation Method
The risk task, which will be referred to as Task R, was based on Hey and Orme (1994) and was used
to elicit participants’ risk preferences. Subjects needed to make choices between two lotteries (i.e.,
probability distributions over monetary amounts) on each computer screen. This setup was identical
to the risk preference task used by Harrison, Hofmeyr, Ross, and Swarthout (2017) [HHRS]. Each
lottery was presented using a pie graph and accompanying text to indicate the probabilities and
prizes for each choice to be made. Participants made 40 choices in total in this task. Figure 1 below
shows the screen presented to subjects for this task.
Figure 1: Screenshot of Task R
The size of the prizes ranged from R0 to R280 and the probabilities ranged from 0 to 1 in increments
of 0.05. This risk preference task therefore makes use of much larger lottery prizes and greater
variation in the probabilities than most other studies, where the latter helps to detect any potential
probability weighting (HHRS).
The lottery pairs present in Task R were based on those developed by Loomes and Sugden (1998),
and are aimed at testing different stochastic specifications of choices in an environment of risk. Their
lottery pairs accommodated various risk preferences and a varied probability space. The pairs were
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also designed in a way that would generate common-ratio tests of expected utility theory. An issue
in Loomes and Sugden (1998), however, is that subjects faced the same set of lottery prizes across
all of their choices. Task R therefore improves upon this by using four different prize contexts: (R0,
R140, R280), (R40, R80, R240), (R20, R100, R220), and (R60, R120, R180), and by doing so helps
identify the utility function and the probability weighting function.
One of the 40 choices presented to subjects was randomly selected for pay out at the end of the task.
The chosen lottery was played out to determine the subjects’ winnings for that task.
3.3 Disentangling Trust and Risk
The above two tasks and between-subject experimental design allow for disentangling risk and trust.
The experimental treatments in Task T are designed in such a way that they act as controls for
factors such as information and prosocial impulses. The first two treatments can be thought of as
two trust treatments. Treatment 1 involved a standard trust game whilst treatment 2 built on this
by providing subjects with additional information on past returns made in previous runs of the
game. Amounts returned in both of these treatments were determined by a human trustee. These
treatments therefore fall under the environment of strategic uncertainty.
The third and fourth treatments can be thought of as two risk treatments. Subjects in treatment
3 faced a basic decision problem under risk since the trust game that they played did not involve
a human trustee partner. The computer made the decision instead. This trustor was also given
additional information on past returns made. Treatment 4, on the other hand, did involve a human
trustee but this trustee did not make a decision. The computer made a decision for the trustee and he
or she received any amount that the computer earned on his or her behalf. Trustors were also given
additional information on past returns. Amounts returned were generated by a computer rather
than by another human. Treatments 3 and 4 therefore fall under the environment of state uncertainty.
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The design of the trust game procedures allows for comparison between the above-mentioned en-
vironments of risk and trust. Comparing treatments 1 and 2 with 3 and 4 allows one to analyse
whether decisions differ between the environments of state uncertainty and strategic uncertainty.
Treatment 1 does not provide any additional information to subjects in the trust game whilst
treatments 2, 3 and 4 provide trustors with past returns made by trustees in previous games played.
Therefore, treatment 1 essentially allows for a control of information provided to participants playing
the trust game. Additionally, since information is provided to treatments 2, 3 and 4, one can analyse
where the risk measures do and do not predict decisions: if risk measures predicted decisions in T3
and T4 (environments of state uncertainty) but not in T2 (an environment of strategic uncertainty),
then one can conclude that this cannot be due to differences in information.
Treatments 1, 2 and 4 all include a human trustee. However, in treatment 4, this trustee is passive
and does not make any decision. The computer makes a decision on the trustee’s behalf and he or
she then receives the earnings of the outcome of the game. Treatment 4 therefore serves as a control
for prosocial impulses: if risk measures help to explain decisions made in this treatment but not
in any of the other treatments involving a human trustee (T1 or T2), then it could be said that
decisions are motivated by a certain need to trust another person rather than he or she trusting due
to the existence of the other person in treatment 4.
3.4 Experimental Sample
The experimental sample consists of 202 students at the University of Cape Town (UCT). Specifically,
49 students participated in treatment 1, 70 in treatment 2, 36 in treatment 3, and lastly, 49 students
participated in treatment 4. These students were recruited through the use of a recruitment poster
emailed to UCT students. All of the experiments were conducted on UCT’s upper campus in
the Commerce computer lab, where a total of 12 sessions were held across 3 weeks in August
of 2016. Each session usually comprised 18 participants and had 1 experimenter and 2 research
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assistants. Each experimental session lasted approximately 45 minutes. Four sessions were allocated
to treatment 2 as it would contain the most information-rich data since it comprised two human
partners. The remaining treatments with two human subjects were allocated 3 sessions each. Lastly,
treatment 3 was allocated 2 sessions as it only involved one player. Dividing the 12 sessions in such
a way allows for greater information to be collected to help answer the research question of whether
or not trust and risk are significantly related. A detailed summary of experimental session dates,
times and treatment allocations can be found in the appendix, Table A1.
On entering the lab, subjects were seated at computers separated by partitions. Each subject
received a fixed show-up fee of R20 which was paid to them at the end of the session. Sub-
jects signed an informed consent form and were shown an introductory presentation explaining
the procedure of the session and the two computerised tasks that they would complete: namely,
Task T and Task R. Half of the participants completed Task T before Task R and the remaining
participants completed Task R prior to Task T, in an attempt to guard against potential order effects.
After the introductory explanation, subjects were given a detailed presentation of the first task and
were then allowed to complete the task. Thereafter they were presented with a detailed explanation
of the second task. Once subjects were done with this task, they were asked to complete a short
written questionnaire that captured their demographic information. Whilst busy with this, their
total payment was determined by the experimenter. Each subject’s earnings were paid out immedi-
ately and in cash. Subjects earned, on average, R127 for Task T and R120 for Task R, excluding
the show-up fee. Taking the R20 show-up fee into account, subjects earned on average a total of R267.
Summary statistics in the first part of Table 3 below show that the minimum and maximum ages
of subjects were 18 and 31 respectively, with a mean age of 21 years. The decomposition of racial
groups and other binary variables is given in the second part of Table 3. A majority of the sample
was African (see Figure A2) and 53% was female. Lastly, 39% of the sample fell under the Commerce
faculty whilst the least represented faculty was Law at approximately 7%.
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Table A2 in the Appendix shows the breakdown of summary statistics by experimental treat-
ments. Balance tests indicate no significant differences in the composition of age (p < 0.17), gender
(p < 0.19), race (p < 0.16), and language (p < 0.38) between the four treatments. Significant
differences were, however, found between treatments with respect to faculty (p < 0.015) and so
caution is advised with regards to validity of results.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 21.30 2.36 18 31
Total Income 2786.87 3814.99 0 30000
Risk Game Earnings 119.80 90.55 0 280
Trust Game Earnings 127.36 61.18 10 390
Total Winnings 266.55 114.89 30 680






















4 Statistical Analysis and Specifications
The statistical method used in this study is the maximum likelihood estimation of structural models
of latent choice processes. These structural models allow estimation of risk preferences from observed
subject data. The maximum likelihood method is useful in that it makes use of all possible available
data to estimate the risk preference parameters and precision of all estimates (HHRS). Hey and
Orme (1994) describe the method as an extremely efficient way to locate the maximum of the
log-likelihood with the least amount of human intervention. A theoretical explanation of this method
follows below.
Suppose the utility of income is defined by a power utility function with constant relative risk
aversion. Then from Wakker (2008), the utility function is:
U(y) =

yr if r > 0
ln(y) if r = 0
−yr if r < 0
where y is the value of the lottery prize and r is the parameter of interest. Under expected utility
theory, the shape of the utility function defines risk preferences. Specifically, if r > 1 the utility
function is convex, indicating risk-loving behaviour. If r = 1 then this points toward a linear utility
function and risk neutral preferences. Or if r < 1 then the utility function is concave, indicating risk
averse behaviour.
Since the risk preference task in this study, Task R, has three potential outcomes, the expected




[ p(yj)× U(yj) ] (1)
where yj is the lottery outcome and p(yj) is the probability associated with that outcome.
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To estimate the value of r, the expected utility of each lottery pair is calculated for an initial estimate
of r. An index ∇EU of the difference is then generated where:
∇EU = EUR − EUL (2)
The ∇EU index is an index based on latent preferences which shows the differences between
expected utilities of the right and left lottery options presented to subjects. The index is linked to an
individuals’ choices through the cumulative Normal distribution function, Φ(∇EU). This transforms
the ∇EU from a range of (−∞;∞) to the range of (0; 1), which then gives the Probit link function
Pr (choosing right lottery) = Φ (∇EU) (3)
This equation illustrates that the right lottery will be chosen if Φ (∇EU) > 12 .
The likelihood of subjects’ responses in the risk preference task is conditional on expected utility
theory and the power utility function both being true. Since this likelihood depends on values for r,
the log-likelihood function conditional on z and X can be written as:
















× I(zi = 0)
) ]
(4)
where I(·) is the indicator function and where zi = 1 represents the right lottery being chosen and
zi = 0 represents the left lottery. In addition, the X variable contains subject demographics and
information such as age, gender, race, etc.
The maximum likelihood estimation method will seek to estimate the equation r = r0 + rβ · X
(where r is the risk preference parameter, r0 is a fixed parameter, and rβ is the coefficient vector
linked to the above-mentioned X variable) and thereby makes the parameter of interest r a linear
function of observed individual characteristics. So for the case of no observable characteristics (i.e. a
homogenous sample), the equation would read: r = r0. Each estimate for r will include a standard
error that reflects uncertainty with regards to the true value of r.
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Trust will be included in the analysis as T with other explanatory variables. The regression equation
therefore becomes r = r0 + rT · T + rβ ·X where rT measures the marginal effect between trust and
risk, and vector X includes demographic variables. The risk preference parameter, r, will determine
whether or not there exists a significant relationship between risk and trust, whilst controlling for
other factors.
This estimation method also allows for behavioural errors made by subjects when making a choice.
This can occur, for example, if a subject intended to choose the left lottery but instead chose the
right lottery accidently. Other such errors, from Hey and Orme (1994), include misunderstanding
the experiment, pressing the wrong button on the keyboard, or being in a hurry to complete the
task. Estimation will therefore make use of the contextual utility behavioural error specification of
Wilcox (2011), which will allow for robust inferences. This type of error specification normalises the
∇EU index into the [0, 1] interval. It also incorporates the behavioural error term µ from Fechner
(1966), which implies that as the ∇EU index becomes smaller, subjects become more likely to make








where λ is the normalising term and µ is the Fechner error term.
For this new index, as µ→ 0 it becomes a deterministic choice model so that the choice made by
a subject will be based on the expected utility of the two lotteries that they face. On the other
hand, when µ→∞ it will be the case that ∇EU → 0 and so the choice made by the subject can be
considered random since there is now equal probability of choosing either the left or right lottery.
Lastly, when µ = 1 we return to the previous index from Equation (2): ∇EU = EUR − EUL. From
this we can conclude that the Fechner error term µ flattens the probit link function as it increases.
From this, the new conditional log-likelihood function can be written as:




















To estimate the parameter of interest capturing risk preferences, r, and the Fechner error term, µ,
the above equation will be maximised.
This study will also focus on another model of choice under uncertainty: the rank-dependent utility
model of Quiggin (1982). This model states that risk preferences are determined by the shape of the
utility function, as well as the probability weighting function [PWF]. Putting these two together
gives the rank-dependent utility function
RDUi =
∑





with the weights wj = π(pj + . . . +pn)−π(pj+1 + . . . +pn) for j = 1, . . . , n− 1 and where wj = π(pj)
for j = n. The variable j takes on values that rank potential outcomes from the worst possible
outcome to the best. The function π(p) is a specific PWF.
For example, the PWF by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) [henceforth, TK] can be written as
π(p) = p
γ[




for 0 < p < 1. This function allows for the S-shaped and inverse S-shaped forms. Gonzalez and Wu
(1999) find that it is usually the case that 0 < γ < 1. This then gives rise to its inverse S-shape
where low probabilities are overweighted until the point where π(p) = p. Thereafter, moderate to
high probabilities are underweighted.
So this estimation method assumes a rank-dependent utility model, with a power utility function,
contextual error specification, and the TK PWF. Then the rank-dependent utility index, similar to









As occurred under the expected utility model, subject choices are linked to the RDU index through
the cumulative Normal distribution. This is then used to estimate the parameters r, µ, and the
parameter in the TK PWF, γ.
Another two PWFs that will be used are the Power function and Prelec (1998) [henceforth, Prelec]
function. The Power PWF replaces the prizes in the power utility function with probabilities, and is
π(p) = pγ (10)








for 0 < p < 1, η > 0 and γ > 0.
The power PWF can be linear, concave, or convex, and so probabilities can either be linearly
weighted, overweighted, or underweighted. This PWF does not allow for the S-shape forms or inverse
S-shapes of the TK PWF. The Prelec PWF, on the other hand, does allow for this. In addition, the
two parameters of the Prelec PWF allow for the separate specification of concavity and location: γ
controls the PWF’s concavity whilst η controls the location of the inflexion point relative to the 45◦
line (Al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010).
This study will therefore use both the expected utility model and the rank-dependent utility model.
Both take into account potential subject error. These models will be used to analyse risk preferences




In this section, an exploratory analysis of the data is conducted: section 5.1 gives an overview of trust
findings and 5.2 of risk findings. Thereafter, the risk-trust confound is investigated in section 5.3
and results from the Expected Utility Model and the Rank-Dependent Utility Model are presented.
5.1 Exploratory Analysis of Trust Data
5.1.1 Amounts Sent in the Trust Game
Initial analyses on the pooled dataset show that trustors sent on average R34 of their R100 endow-
ment to trustees and trustees (excluding second players in treatments 3 and 4) returned on average
R37. Relatively speaking, trustees usually returned on average 33% of what they received from
trustors. Table 4 provides further means and standard deviations for the overall sample.
A distribution of amounts sent for the pooled sample can be seen in Figure 2 below. Lower amounts
were sent to trustees more often than higher amounts, as seen in the heavy left tail of the distribution,
with the exception of sending half or the whole R100 endowment. A majority of the sample, 22%
of subjects, chose to send between R20 and R30, out of R100 to their trustee partner. The least
chosen amounts to send to one’s partner varied between R60 and R90.
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5.1.2 Amounts Returned in the Trust Game
In absolute terms (Figure A3) more than 60% of trustees returned less than R50. In relative terms,
Figure 3 shows that the amount returned by trustees as a percentage of how much they received is
evenly and symmetrically distributed. The large centre mass represents 35% of trustees who chose
to return approximately 33%, or a third, of what they received from trustors. A smaller proportion
chose to return less than 20% and an even smaller proportion chose to return more than 50%.















Distribution of Relative Amounts Returned by Trustees
5.1.3 Amounts Sent by Subject Demographics
Further exploratory analysis on the pooled data was done by inspecting the amounts sent for different
factors of subject demographics. The histogram for the average amount sent according to subject
age can be seen in Figure A4. Similar levels of trust were found in individuals between the ages of
20 and 23. Older subjects (aged 29 and above) displayed the greatest amount of trust.
Based on average amounts sent by trustors, a statistically significant difference (t-test, p < 0.001)
between trusting decisions of males and females was found: Figure A5 in the Appendix shows that
females sent on average R32 to their partners whilst males sent on average R36. Figure A6 shows
that the most trusting population group is Whites who sent on average R49. The least trusting
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racial groups are Coloureds and Indians. Tests indicate a statistically significant difference between
amounts sent by Whites and non-Whites (t-test, p < 0.001). These results confirm similar findings
by Ashraf et al. (2006) who discovered a statistically significant difference in trusting behaviour
between South African Whites and non-Whites.
5.1.4 Amounts Sent by Treatment
Trust data for each treatment can be seen in Table 4. The largest amount sent by trustors occurred
in treatment 1, the basic trust game, where R36 was sent on average by player 1s. The smallest
average amount sent was R30, indicating that the lowest level of trust occurred in treatment 4
where the computer played on behalf of a passive human trustee. Amounts sent in treatment 1
differed significantly with amounts sent in treatment 2 (t-test, p = 0.0658) and treatment 4 (t-test,
p < 0.001): trusting decisions made in a standard trust game were significantly different to decisions
made in the same game with additional information and a game where the computer played on
behalf of a human trustee. Amounts sent in treatment 4 also differed significantly with amounts
sent in treatment 2 (t-test, p < 0.001) and treatment 3 (t-test, p < 0.001): decisions made with a
passive human trustee were significantly different to decisions made when playing with an active
partner and playing against the computer with no human partner.
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Table 4: Trust Results by Treatment
Mean Std. Dev Min Max Observations
Overall Sample
Amount sent by Player 1 33.74 27.24 0 100 118
Tripled amount received by Player 2 105.61 95.04 0 300 59
Amount returned by Player 2 37.17 40.36 0 150 54
Percentage returned1 32.73 20.72 0 66.67 54
Treatment 1
Amount sent by Player 1 35.65 31.85 0 100 23
Tripled amount received by Player 2 108.75 93.86 0 300 24
Amount returned by Player 2 49.29 46.67 0 150 21
Percentage returned1 36.05 21.42 0 66.67 21
Treatment 2
Amount sent by Player 1 33.63 32.36 0 100 35
Tripled amount received by Player 2 103.46 97.15 0 300 35
Amount returned by Player 2 29.45 34.33 0 150 33
Percentage returned1 30.61 20.30 0 66.67 33
Treatment 3
Amount sent by Player 1 35.19 22.77 0 100 36
Treatment 4
Amount sent by Player 1 29.88 21.08 0 80 24
Notes: 1Percentage of tripled amount received by Player 2 that Player 2 decided to return to Player 1.
The amount that player 2 then returned to player 1 is captured as a percentage in the same table: the
percentage of the tripled amount received by the trustee that this trustee then sent back to the trustor.
These amounts were calculated only for treatments 1 and 2 where human trustees were present. The
highest return percentage can be seen in treatment 1, indicating that a greater level of trustworthiness
took place in the standard trust game with no additional information. A lower level of trustworthi-
ness occurred in treatment 2 where trustors were provided with additional information on the past
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behaviour of trustees. The difference in trustworthiness between these two treatments was found to
be statistically significant (t-test, p < 0.001). Trustworthiness decisions in treatments 3 and 4 were
made by the computer and followed a fixed distribution extracted from the original BDM Trust Game.
Histograms of amounts sent for each treatment are presented below. Figure 4 shows that amounts
sent in treatments 1 and 2 follow a similar distribution with an almost identical large mass at both
right tails. Fewer subjects chose not to trust in treatment 2 compared to 1. Tests indicate no
significant difference between mean amounts sent in treatments 1 and 2 (t-test, p = 0.1316). Fisher’s
Exact Test indicates no statistically significant relationship between amounts sent by trustors and
those trustors belonging to treatments 1 and 2 (p = 0.763). These results, in addition to the visual
similarity of the two distributions, imply that having the additional information on past returns
did not markedly affect trusting decisions. A similar such finding was discovered by HSW, who
found that the prior information given to subjects in the 3 treatments did not differ from the prior
information that subjects already had.
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The distributions of treatments 3 and 4 also closely resemble one another. A similar finding was
uncovered by HSW where the distributions of treatments 3 and 4 (Risk-1 and Risk-2 in HSW)
display more mass at the centre and less at the tails than for treatments 1 and 2 (Trust-1 and
Trust-2 in HSW). This indicates that the distributions of the former two treatments have greater
variance than the distributions for the latter two.
Tests for differences in means show a statistically significant difference between mean amounts sent in
treatment 3 and mean amounts sent in treatment 4 (t-test, p < 0.001). Based on this, the presence of
a human trustee in treatment 4 therefore does change the trusting behaviour of individuals compared
to playing the game in treatment 3 without a human partner: trustors playing with no human
trustee (treatment 3) chose to send significantly more than trustors whose computer partner earned
winnings on behalf of a passive human trustee. This is in contrast to what was found by HSW, who
discovered that the presence of a human receiver did not change behaviour. These findings, on the
other hand, suggest that prosocial impulses may in fact influence the trusting behaviour of subjects.
5.2 Exploratory Analysis of Risk Data
This section gives the exploratory findings of the risk preference parameter r. The parameter is
initially modelled in Table 5 using the expected utility theory model, with contextual error specifica-
tion, to obtain an estimate for risk parameter r for the pooled dataset. Thereafter, a kernel density
plot gives the distribution of risk preferences and Table 6 gives additional risk estimates in more detail.
5.2.1 Risk Preferences for Pooled Sample
A basic regression analysis was conducted on the pooled sample in Table 5. This made use of
the power utility function with contextual error specification. Individual clustering was taken into
account since each subject made multiple choices across 40 lottery pairs. The regression equation
is r = r0, stemming from the previously-stated equation r = r0 + rβ ·X that has been altered to
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accommodate for homogenous preferences. This model gives the estimates: r = 0.047 and µ = 0.262.
The value of r suggests high relative risk aversion. Error term µ is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Consequently, this means that individuals in this specific sample were found to have made
behavioural errors in the risk task, Task R.
Table 5: ML1 Estimation using Expected Utility
Theory and homogenous preferences
Pooled






* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Coefficients presented and standard errors in brackets.
Results pooled across all individuals.
Clustering at individual level taken into account.
1Maximum Likelihood estimation method.
The kernel density in Figure 5 below shows the distribution of risk parameter r. Most subjects are
found to be risk averse. This is in line with the literature which finds that, on average, subjects
act as risk averse individuals (Eckel and Wilson (2004), Holt and Laury (2002), HSW, Sapienza,
Toldra, and Zingales (2007)). In particular, 62% of the pooled sample (Figure A11 of Appendix)
displayed high levels of risk aversion. Approximately 3 individuals exhibited risk neutral behaviour
and only 1 out of 202 individuals exhibited risk seeking behaviour. The average value of r for the
pooled sample is 0.047 (see Table 6).
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5.2.2 Risk Preferences by Gender
Females displayed greater risk aversion than males. Table 6 gives the mean values of r for males and
females as 0.2 and 0.0002 respectively (see also Table A3 for regression output). This points toward
high risk aversion for females and females being more risk averse than males. The difference in
risk preferences between genders is statistically significant (Fisher’s Exact Test, p < 0.001). Similar
results were discovered by Schechter (2007), who found that males were less risk averse than females.
Eckel and Wilson (2004) also found that in all of their risk measurements, men were more risk-seeking
on average and more likely than females to take a risky gamble.
5.2.3 Risk Preferences by Treatment and Player
On average, second players (receivers) were less risk averse than first players (senders). Subjects
in treatments 2 and 3 displayed greater risk aversion than subjects in treatments 1 and 4 (see
Table 6). The greatest aversion to risk was exhibited by treatment 3 participants (r = 0.0002)
who played the trust game with no human partner and in a pure risk environment. Table A6 in
the Appendix gives interaction results between the amount sent in the trust game and the four
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treatments. It shows that amounts sent and each treatment is significantly related to risk preferences.
Table 6: Risk Preferences Results
r N
Overall Sample 0.0469 8080
Males 0.2005 3760
Females 0.0002 4240
Player 11 0.0004 4760
Player 2 0.1198 3320
Treatment 1 0.1286 1920
Treatment 2 0.0059 2800
Treatment 3 0.0002 1440
Treatment 4 0.1419 1920
Notes: 1Risk parameters estimated on player 1s only.
5.3 Analysis of Risk and Trust
This section focuses on the research question and aims to investigate the risk-trust confound. Regres-
sion models using Expected Utility theory and Rank-Dependent Utility theory will be presented and
analysed to estimate the relationship between trusting behaviour and risk preferences. Using both
utility functions and probability weighting in this way guards against a potential bias of estimates
that may arise when one ignores probability weighting. If it is present, then one should apportion
risk preferences into their respective utility or probability weighting components (HHRS). This then
allows for stronger inferences to be made about risk and trust.
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5.3.1 Expected Utility [EU] Theory Model
In this section, EU models are presented. These models make use of the Power Utility function and
the contextual error specification. Results are given in Table 7 and Table 8.
5.3.1.1 EU Heterogenous Models
The EU model in Table 7 takes into account observed heterogeneous preferences. It includes ex-
planatory variables and the trust variable, the latter of which indicates the willingness of player 1s
to trust: trustors who send a higher amount to their partner display greater levels of trust, while
trustors who send lower amounts display lower levels of trust. In this regression equation, parameter
r is estimated as a function of certain demographic variables as well as the amount sent in the trust
game, a binary variable for whether the risk game was played first, and dummy variables for three
of the four treatments. The demographic variables are student age (defined between the ages of 18
and 24), White population group, and male. This model therefore captures the marginal effects
between trust and risk, whilst controlling for other potential factors.
Every variable in this model is statistically significant. The estimate on the amount sent by trustors,
as a fraction of the trustor’s endowment, is 0.193 with a standard deviation of 0.02. This positive
coefficient is interesting because it shows that subjects who chose to send more in the trust game were
found to be less risk averse: that is, more trusting individuals displayed more risk-seeking behaviour.
This variable is significant at the 1% level and implies a statistically significant relationship between
risk and trust in the pooled sample. This result suggests that trust measurements are in fact being
confounded by risk preferences and that a game designed to measure trust is not actually measuring
trust in and of itself.
The positive coefficient on age means that as students become older, their risk preferences become
more risk-seeking. Being male is also associated with greater risk-seeking behaviour. White indi-
viduals were significantly more risk averse than those belonging to any other racial group. There
is an order effect present as subjects who played the risk task first had significantly different risk
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preferences, and were more risk-seeking, than those who played the trust game first. Subjects who
were in treatments 1, 2 and 3 were significantly more risk-loving than subjects in treatment 4.




Student Age 0.087∗∗∗ (0.01)
White −0.068∗∗∗ (0.01)
Male 0.111∗∗∗ (0.01)
Risk Task played first 0.019∗∗∗ (0.00)
Fraction Sent 0.193∗∗∗ (0.02)
Treatment 1 0.106∗∗∗ (0.01)
Treatment 2 0.067∗∗∗ (0.01)






* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in brackets. Clustering
at individual level and heterogeneous preferences taken into account.
1Maximum Likelihood estimation method.
2Results pooled across all individuals.
3Amount sent: fraction of R100 endowment that trustors sent to trustees.
5.3.1.2 EU Heterogenous Models: Risk and Trust Environments
Lastly, dividing the sample into decisions made by a computer and decisions made by a human,
breaks it down into an environment of risk and of trust respectively. These results can be seen in
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Table 8. Once again, order effects are present: playing the risk task first in an environment of risk
significantly increases one’s preference for risk, whilst playing the risk game first in an environment
of trust makes one significantly more averse to risk.
Table 8: ML1 Estimation using EU
for Risk and Trust Environments
Trust Environment2 Risk Environment3
Power Function Parameter (r)






Risk Task played first −0.024∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)









* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in brackets. 1Maximum Likelihood estimation.
2Includes Treatments 1 and 2. Represents environment of strategic uncertainty.
3Includes Treatments 3 and 4. Represents environment of state uncertainty.
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The estimate on trust in the environment of trust is 0.242 and in the environment of risk it is 0.13.
Results show that risk and trust are statistically significantly related in both the environment of
risk and the environment of trust. Risk preferences therefore predicted decisions in the purely risky
environment, as one would expect. However, risk also played a role in predicting decisions made in
environments involving trust. This therefore suggests that trusting decisions are in fact confounded
by risk preferences.
A relationship therefore does exist between trusting decisions and risk preferences: using Expected
Utility Theory and the power utility function with contextual error specification, one can conclude
that trusting behaviour and risk preferences are in fact significantly related. Hence, measurements
of trust are confounded by an individual’s risk preferences.
5.3.2 Rank-Dependent Utility [RDU] Theory Model
The Rank-Dependent Utility model builds on the Expected Utility model above by taking into
account probability weighting. RDU models give a better sense of the relationship between risk
and trust as decision-making could potentially be influenced by the way in which subjects perceive
probabilities. The following PWFs will be used in the RDU analysis: the TK PWF from equation 8
above, the Power function from equation 10, and the Prelec function from equation 11. RDU models
are estimated and presented in the section below.
5.3.2.1 RDU Homogenous Models
Using these three PWFs, as well as the power utility function and contextual error specification,
RDU models for the pooled sample, assuming homogenous preferences, are estimated and presented
in Table 9. The estimates for r across all three models are statistically significant and imply that
the relationship between risk and trust is influenced by the curvature of the utility function.
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For the first column in Table 9, making use of the power PWF, the γ estimate is 1.413, which is
significantly different from 1 (p = 0.042). This indicates a large underweighting of all probabilities
and this can be seen in Figure 6. For the second column, the γ estimate of the TK PWF is 0.808 and
this significantly differs from 1 (p < 0.001). The result is an inverse S-shape, with an overweighting
of low probabilities and an underweighting of moderate to high probabilities. This can be seen in the
second row of Figure 6. Subjects were therefore inflating the probability of a rare chance: trustors
perceived the probability of receiving nothing in return from trustees as being higher than it actually
was. The third column of the table uses the Prelec PWF and produces estimates γ = 0.762 and
η = 0.984. While γ was found to significantly differ from 1 (p < 0.001), η was not (p = 0.7351). The
estimate for γ indicates that the PWF is strictly concave for low probabilities and strictly convex
for high probabilities. This gives rise to the similar inverse S-shape seen with the TK PWF.
Table 9: ML1 Estimation using RDU and homogenous
preferences for the pooled sample
Power PWF TK PWF Prelec PWF
Power Function Parameter (r) 0.000** 0.122** 0.152***
(0.00) (0.05) (0.04)
PWF Parameter (γ) 1.413*** 0.808*** 0.762***
(0.20) (0.03) (0.03)
PWF Parameter (η) 0.984***
(0.05)
Error (µ) 0.356*** 0.246*** 0.237***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
N 8080 8080 8080
Log-likelihood -4731.4194 -4704.1415 -4693.3815
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients presented and standard errors in brackets.
Individual clustering and homogenous preferences.
1Maximum Likelihood estimation method.
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The significance of γ and η across all three models implies that decisions are in fact influenced by
the way in which individuals perceive probabilities. Probability weighting therefore does play a role
and should be taken into account.
Figure 6: Estimated PWFs
for homogenous preferences
5.3.2.2 RDU Heterogenous Models
Further analysis on the pooled dataset was done in Table 10 by taking into account the same
demographic and task variables used in the EU model. These include student age, being White,
male, the fraction of amount sent in the trust game and whether the risk game was played first. In
addition, dummy variables for each treatment were included in the regression equation but were
omitted from the table below due to space. Only the two-parameter Prelec PWF was used in this
analysis as it takes into account the inverse S-shape of the PWF and it has the highest log-likelihood
of all three previously-estimated models. The model below therefore presents the marginal effects
between trust and risk using this Prelec PWF.
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Table 10: ML1 Estimation using RDU and heterogenous
preferences (marginal effects)
Prelec
Power Function Parameter (r)
Student Age 0.089 (0.11)
White −0.096 (0.10)
Male 0.047 (0.08)
Risk Task played first 0.026 (0.09)
Fraction Sent 0.181 (0.14)
Constant −0.071 (0.15)
PWF Parameter (γ)
Student Age 0.062 (0.09)
White −0.131 (0.09)
Male −0.090 (0.10)
Risk Task played first −0.002 (0.10)
Fraction Sent −0.116 (0.15)
Constant 0.877∗∗∗ (0.18)
PWF Parameter (η)
Student Age −0.145 (0.31)
White 0.067 (0.14)
Male −0.395 ∗ ∗ (0.18)
Risk Task played first 0.142 (0.19)






* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 1Maximum Likelihood estimation.
Coefficients presented. Standard errors in brackets. Treatment dummies
excluded due to space constraints. See Appendix Table A7 for full set of estimates.
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As was found with the EU model, a positive (but insignificant) relationship was discovered between
the amount sent in the trust game and the curvature of the utility function, r. The amount sent is
insignificant under γ but significant under η. A comparison of this η estimate across homogenous
and heterogenous models indicates that when trust is not included in the regression equation (Table
9), low probabilities are overweighted. However, when trust is included in the model (Table 10), this
overweighting becomes accentuated: the change in η when trust is introduced essentially heightens
an individual’s risk aversion for low probabilities. That is, subjects overweight probabilities even
more when they make a trusting decision compared to making a decision that does not involve trust.
Hence the decision to trust is affected by the way in which individuals perceive probabilities.
5.3.2.3 RDU Heterogenous Models: Risk and Trust Environments
Lastly, the environments of trust and of risk are explored under RDU theory in Table 11. It shows
that in the trust environment, which comprises treatments 1 and 2, it is probability weighting
that affects decisions since trust is only statistically significant under parameter η. In the trust
environment, subjects are therefore overweighting the possibility of rare events and hence sending
less because of an increased perceived riskiness of sending a larger amount. The opposite is true for
the risk environment, which is made up of treatments 3 and 4. In this risky environment, where
probabilities are objectively known, it is the utility function that is influencing decisions and not
probability weighting. Subjects therefore do not perceive an increased riskiness when making trusting
decisions where the probabilities of outcomes are known, but do experience an increased riskiness
when they have to trust another person.
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Table 11: ML1 Estimation using RDU: Environments of Trust & Risk
Trust Environment2 Risk Environment3
Power Function Parameter (r)
Student Age 0.000 (0.00) 0.088∗∗∗ (0.00)
White 0.010 (0.02) 0.000 (0.00)
Male 0.201 (0.12) 0.015∗∗∗ (0.00)
Risk Task played first −0.052 (0.12) −0.072∗∗∗ (0.00)
Fraction Sent 0.106 (0.21) 0.154∗∗∗ (0.00)
Constant 0.042 (0.13) −0.031∗∗∗ (0.00)
PWF Parameter (γ)
Student Age 0.220∗ (0.12) −0.188 (0.13)
White −0.161 (0.12) 0.060 (0.10)
Male 0.022 (0.12) −0.180 (0.14)
Risk Task played first −0.197 (0.13) 0.182 (0.14)
Fraction Sent −0.158 (0.14) −0.237 (0.21)
Constant 0.773∗∗∗ (0.14) 1.077∗∗∗ (0.28)
PWF Parameter (η)
Student Age −0.016 (0.26) −0.836 (1.03)
White 0.178 (0.21) 0.845 ∗ ∗ (0.38)
Male −0.054 (0.21) −0.481 ∗ ∗ (0.22)
Risk Task played first 0.016 (0.23) 0.098 (0.22)
Fraction Sent −0.685∗∗∗ (0.24) −0.096 (0.41)
Constant 1.250∗∗∗ (0.35) 2.068∗ (1.12)
Error (µ)
Constant 0.238∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.249∗∗∗ (0.02)
N 2320 2320
Log-Likelihood -1323.3638 -1263.2843
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010. 1Maximum Likelihood estimation method.
2The trust environment consists of treatments 1 and 2.
3The risk environment consists of treatments 3 and 4.
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6 Discussion
This study aimed to analyse the relationship between risk preferences and trusting behaviour. It took
into account various factors including potential subject error, probability weighting, and curvature
of the utility function. The analysis finds that subjects make errors on average and that probability
weighting plays a role in decision-making.
In terms of trust, it was found that the greatest level of both trust and trustworthiness occurred
in treatment 1. Trustors were likely to trust their partner with more money when they were not
influenced by additional information on that partner and when they knew that their partner was
another human individual as opposed to a computer. Conversely, trustees were likely to return more
money to their partner when they knew that their partner had made a genuine decision to trust
them and had not made their choice on the basis of the additional information that was presented
to them.
In general, trustors sent on average R34 to their trustee partner and trustees returned on average
33% of what they received from the trustor. It was found that providing additional information on
trustees to trustors, in the form of a typical return distribution, does not significantly affect trusting
decisions. This was also discovered by HSW. The presence of a human trustee, however, does affect
trusting decisions and this result contradicts findings by HSW. Trustors who played against the
computer sent significantly more than trustors who played with a human partner that they were
not actively interacting with. Individuals were therefore more inclined to trust their money to a
computer, who would not earn anything, over a human individual, who would get to keep their
earnings based on the game. One interpretation of this is that subjects chose to trust their fellow
human subjects less, possibility due to the fear of betrayal or deception that is not present in a
computer that made decisions based on a fixed distribution. These potential concerns from trustors
are deemed valid since only between 31% and 36% of the tripled amounts received by trustees was
actually returned to trustors.
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Male trustors were found to have sent significantly more to trustees than female trustors. In line with
the literature, females displayed greater risk aversion than males and this difference was statistically
significant. Females can therefore be interpreted as the less trusting and more risk averse gender, at
least in this sample. Hence, females are more cautious and more reserved with regards to financial
situations and decisions involving money.
In terms of risk, it was found that risk preferences of subjects varied between experimental treatments.
There are two possible causes for this. Firstly, order effects were found and subjects who had played
the risk task first and in an environment of risk exhibited significantly less risk aversion than subjects
who had played the trust game first in the same environment. Conversely, subjects who had played
the risk game first and in an environment of trust were found to be significantly more averse to risk.
Order effects therefore played an important role in risk and trust measurements. Secondly, it is
important to note that the lower level of risk aversion amongst treatments 1 and 4 may due to the
fact that there was an uneven number of sessions in these treatments: treatment 1 had 2 sessions
where Task R was played first and 1 where Task T was played first; treatment 4 had 2 sessions
where Task T was played first and 1 where Task R was played first.
Results find that subjects who sent more in the trust game were less risk averse. That is, indi-
viduals who were more trusting exhibited greater risk-seeking behaviour. It was also found that
risk preferences were able to predict decisions in the purely risky environment, where probabilities
were objectively known, as one should expect. However, risk preferences were also able to predict
decisions in the trust environment. Risk in this sample therefore helped to explain decisions made
in an environment of risk and, at the same time, decisions made in an environment of trust. These
results indicate a clear and significant relationship between risk and trust. Trust measurements are
therefore being confounded by measures of risk so that low levels of trust may simply be due to an
individual’s high level of risk aversion.
Trust and risk were found to be linked through the curvature of the utility function as well as
through subjective distortions of probabilities. Results from RDU models point toward PWFs with
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an inverse S-shape, emphasising an overweighting of low probabilities and an underweighting of
moderate to high probabilities. This overweighting is accentuated when trust is introduced: subjects
perceived increased risk when making a trusting decision and sent less as a result. Extracted from
the histogram presented to subjects, trustors were provided with information that indicated, in
previous runs of the trust game, that the likelihood of receiving nothing in return was 20% whilst
the probability of receiving the full amount that they had sent was 3%. However, with probability
weighting, these events were overweighted and essentially increased the riskiness of sending larger
amounts by trustors. Probability weighting therefore does influence the determination of risk
preferences and decisions are affected by an individual’s perception of probabilities.
There are, however, limitations to this study. These include the fact that the sample consisted of
students and is therefore not sufficiently representative of the population. One therefore has to
question the external validity of this experiment and the accompanying results. Further research
can be done to overcome this issue by seeking out subject participants from the general population
rather than recruiting from a university. In addition, the four experimental treatments were not
sufficiently balanced in terms of students’ faculty departments. Future research should attempt to
control for this, with safeguards in place to prevent over-sampling of any one specific faculty or
through the use of sampling weights. One also has to question whether the rewards were sufficiently
high enough so as to result in accurate and reliable responses. In comparison to the literature, prize




This study adds to the literature on the role of preferences in the level and extent of trust. The
experimental design made use of four different trust game treatments, separated into two trust
treatments and two risks treatments. The two trust treatments made use of human trustees and
represented an environment of strategic uncertainty. The two risk treatments, on the other hand,
represented an environment of state uncertainty and return decisions were made by a computer.
The difference between treatments was as follows: T1 was a standard trust game with two human
players; T2 was a standard trust game that provided trustors with additional information on past
trustee behaviour; T3 had no human trustee and the trustor played solely against a computer; and
lastly T4 involved the trustor playing against a computer that made decisions and earned money on
behalf of a passive human trustee. Risk preferences were measured using a risk task based on Hey
and Orme (1994) where subjects made choices between two lotteries.
Risk and trust were analysed using the Expected Utility Model and the Rank-Dependent Utility
Model. Demographic variables, task variables, and treatment dummies were included in the analysis,
in addition to the trust covariate, to allow for the estimation of the marginal effects between trust
and risk. Risk and trust were found to be significantly related. Measures of trust are therefore
confounded by risk preferences and varying levels of trust may actually have more to do with an
individual’s risk preference than their inherit trusting behaviour.
Individuals who are less trusting are also averse to risk. An individual who is actually very trusting
could appear less willing to trust due to their high level of risk aversion, that essentially hinders
their ability to trust a larger amount to another person. Analyses that evaluate trust without taking
into account risk preferences, then only capture that the individual is less trusting and does not
take into account the potential dampening effect that risk attitudes have on trusting behaviour.
Conversely, individuals who are observed to be more trusting or who are evaluated by typical trust
measurements to exhibit greater levels of trust, may simply be more risk-seeking than others and
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hence display more trusting characteristics. Their preference towards risk amplifies their level of
trust and hence makes it appear as though they are more trusting than they actually are. Risk
preferences therefore need to be evaluated whenever one measures and analyses trust.
Trust and risk were discovered to be linked in two ways: through the curvature of the utility function
and through probability weighting. Subjects overweight low probabilities and underweight moderate
to high probabilities. This effect is accentuated when moving from decisions that do not involve trust
to decisions that do. Individuals perceived an even greater riskiness when they had to make a trusting
decision. Probability weighting therefore does influence the decision-making process and individuals
do subjectively distort probabilities. In addition, risk preferences predicted trusting decisions in
the environments of both risk and of trust. Risk therefore plays a role in risky decisions, but also
underpins decisions involving trust. Hence, trusting decisions are often perceived by individuals as
decisions involving risk.
This study adds to the literature investigating a potential relationship between risk preferences and
trusting decisions. These results beg the question of what trust actually is. Does it mean overcoming
risk aversion? Or is it some innate property that can be masked by risk aversion? There is a clear
risk-trust confound: a subject may be classified as trusting when actually they are just risk-seeking,
or seen as non-trusting when they are simply risk averse. It is therefore of vital importance to take
into account individual risk preferences when making inferences about trusting behaviour, so as to
avoid the risk-trust confound that is present in individuals.
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Part A1: The Experiment and Experimental Sample
Table A1: Details of Experimental Sessions
Session Date Time Treatment Order1 Number of Subjects
1 10/08/2016 14h00 1 RG 18
2 11/08/2016 14h00 2 TG 17
3 11/08/2016 16h00 2 RG 18
4 16/08/2016 14h00 3 TG 18
5 16/08/2016 16h00 3 RG 18
6 17/08/2016 14h00 1 TG 16
7 17/08/2016 16h00 1 RG 14
8 18/08/2016 14h00 2 TG 17
9 18/08/2016 16h00 2 RG 18
10 23/08/2016 14h00 4 TG 12
11 24/08/2016 14h00 4 RG 18
12 25/08/2016 14h00 4 TG 18
Notes: 1Risk Game [RG] or Trust Game [TG] played first to guard against potential
order effects.
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Figure A1: Histogram shown to subjects in Treatments 2, 3 and 4
Note: Return distributions by subjects in original Berg et al. (1995) game







Sample by Population Group
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Table A2: Summary Statistics of Variables by Treatment
Variable Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Age 21.42 21.20 21.47 21.19
Total Income 3371.28 2242.65 3327.27 2610.43
Risk Game Earnings 120.83 123.43 110.00 120.83
Trust Game Earnings 136.49 134.20 98.78 129.87
Total Winnings 274.48 277.63 228.78 270.81
Variable Percentage of sample
Gender
Female 58.33% 55.07% 60.00% 39.58%
Male 41.67% 44.93% 40.00% 60.42%
Race
African 51.06% 48.53% 54.29% 40.43%
White 21.28% 26.47% 25.71% 10.64%
Coloured 19.15% 14.71% 8.57% 25.53%
Indian/Asian 8.51% 10.29% 11.43% 23.40%
Four Main Languages
English 72.92% 64.29% 77.78% 72.92%
IsiXhosa 10.42% 10.00% 5.56% 8.33%
IsiZulu 2.08% 5.71% 11.11% 6.25%%
Afrikaans 4.17% 2.86% 0% 0%
Faculty
Commerce 37.50% 34.29% 30.56% 54.17%
Humanities 27.08% 18.57% 38.89% 12.50%
Engineering 12.50% 10.00% 11.11% 22.92%
Science 18.75% 10.00% 2.78% 2.08%
Health Sciences 2.08% 12.86% 11.11% 4.17%
Law 2.08% 14.29% 5.56% 4.17%
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Part A2: Average Amounts Sent and Returned









0 50 100 150




Distribution of Absolute Amounts Returned by Trustees





























18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Note: Average amount sent by trustors to trustees across discrete ages.
Pooled dataset
Average amount sent by age
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Note: Average amount sent by male and female trustors to trustees.
Pooled dataset
Average amount sent by Gender




















African Indian/Asian Coloured White
Note: Average amount sent by trustors to trustees according to Racial Group.
Pooled dataset
Average amount sent by Population Group
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Note: Average amount sent by trustors to trustees according to first language.
Pooled Dataset
Average amount sent by Language
















































Note: Average amount sent by trustors to trustees according to faculty.
Pooled Dataset
Average amount sent by Faculty
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Note: Average amount sent by trustors to trustees according to current financial situation.
Pooled Dataset
Average amount sent by Financial Situation
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Amount returned by Player 2
Sample divided by Treatment
Distribution of Absolute Amounts Returned by Trustees
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Part A3: Expected Utility Theory Regression Output
Table A3: ML1 Estimation using EU
and homogenous preferences by Gender
Males Females
Power Function Parameter (r) 0.201*** 0.000***
(0.07) (0.00)




* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients presented. Standard errors
in brackets. Individual clustering and homogenous preferences.
1Maximum Likelihood estimation method.
Table A4: ML1 Estimation using EU
and homogenous preferences by Treatment
Pooled Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Power Function
Parameter (r) 0.047 0.129 0.006 0.000 0.142
(0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.00) (0.11)
Error (µ)
Constant 0.262*** 0.236*** 0.254*** 0.250*** 0.267***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
N 8080 1920 2800 1440 1920
Log-Likelihood -4740.4119 -1139.7167 -1598.2757 -815.09628 -1174.0199
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients presented and standard errors in brackets.
Individual clustering and homogenous preferences. 1Maximum Likelihood estimation method.
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Table A5: ML1 Estimation using EU
and homogenous preferences for Player 1s
Player 1
Pooled Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Power Function
Parameter (r) 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.045
(0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16)
Error (µ)
Constant 0.278*** 0.280*** 0.257*** 0.250*** 0.255***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
N 4760 960 1400 1440 960
Log-Likelihood -2777.2775 -596.06203 -798.39722 -815.09628 -558.71116
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients presented and standard errors in brackets.
Individual clustering and homogenous preferences. 1Maximum Likelihood estimation method.
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Table A6: ML1 Estimation using EU
and homogenous preferences: Interaction Models
No Interaction Interaction
Power Function Parameter (r)
Fraction Sent 0.157* 0.424***
(0.09) (0.02)
Treatment 2 -0.151*** -0.035***
(0.04) (0.01)
Treatment 3 -0.151*** -0.036***
(0.04) (0.01)
Treatment 4 -0.114*** -0.036***
(0.04) (0.01)
Treatment 2 × Fraction Sent -0.253***
(0.02)
Treatment 3 × Fraction Sent -0.424***
(0.02)









* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
1Maximum Likelihood estimation method.
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Part A4: Rank-Dependent Utility Theory Regression Ouput
Table A7: ML1 Estimation using RDU
(marginal effects) [full model]2
Prelec
Power Function Parameter (r)
Student Age 0.089 (0.11)
White −0.096 (0.10)
Male 0.047 (0.08)
Risk Task played first 0.026 (0.09)
Fraction Sent 0.181 (0.14)
Treatment 1 0.208 (0.15)
Treatment 2 0.052 (0.09)
Treatment 3 0.081 (0.12)
Constant −0.071 (0.15)
PWF Parameter (γ)
Student Age 0.062 (0.09)
White −0.131 (0.09)
Male −0.090 (0.10)
Risk Task played first −0.002 (0.10)
Fraction Sent −0.116 (0.15)
Treatment 1 −0.001 (0.16)
Treatment 2 −0.060 (0.15)
Treatment 3 −0.032 (0.17)
Constant 0.877∗∗∗ (0.18)
PWF Parameter (η)
Student Age −0.145 (0.31)
White 0.067 (0.14)
Male −0.395 ∗ ∗ (0.18)
Risk Task played first 0.142 (0.19)
Fraction Sent −0.395∗ (0.22)
Treatment 1 0.035 (0.24)
Treatment 2 0.035 (0.16)






* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Coefficients presented. Standard errors in brackets.
1Maximum Likelihood estimation.
2Full model of Table 10.
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Part B: Introduction and Task Instructions
Part B1: Introduction Presentation Slides
Page A13




All of the choices in this task will be made on a computer. 








• The display on your screen will be larger and easier to read. 





As you can see, 20% of t he pie 
chart is blue and this means you 
have a 20% chance of w inning RO. 
This is what the blue text below the 
pie chart tells you: "Chance of 
winning RO is 20%". 
Simi larly, 60% of t he pie chart is red 
w hich means there is a 60% chance 
of winning RlOO. 
This is what the red text below the 
pie chart tells you: "Chance of 
w inning RlOO is 60%". 
Finally, 20% of the pie chart is 
green which means there is a 20% 
chance of winning R200. 
This is what the green text below 
the pie chart tells you : "Chance of 
winning R200 is 20%". 
Your Lottery Earnings 
The amount that you earn from a lottery will be 
determined by the draw of a random number between 1 
and 100. 
Each number between 1 and 100, and including 1 and 100, 
is equally likely to occur. 
You will draw thi s number yourself by rolling two 10-sided 
dice. 
One of the 10-sided dice has sides which increase in 
multiples of 10: 00, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90. 
The other 10-sided dice has sides which increase in 
multiples of 1: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
You will roll the two 10-sided dice together and add the 
numbers on the two dice to select a number between 1 
and 100. 
For example, suppose the one 10-sided dice lands on 70 
and the other 10-sided dice lands on 5. 
Then we will select number 75 . 
We will work through an actua l example of this later. 
Computer Display 
On the computer screen there are two lotteries: a "Left" lottery and a "Right" 
lottery. 
Let's look at the Left lottery together. 
For the Left lottery there is a 20% chance of w inning RO, 
a 60% chance of winning RlOO, 
and a 20% chance of w inning R200. 





The Right Lottery 
If we look at t he Right lottery we 
see that there is a 10% chance of 
w inning RO and a 90% chance of 
w inn ing RlOO. 
10% of the pie chart is blue and 
this means there is a 10% chance 
of winning RO. 
This is w hat the blue text below 
the pie chart tells you: "Chance of 
w inning RO is 10%". 
90% of the pie chart is red which 
means there is a 90% chance of 
w inning Rl OO. 
This is w hat the red text below 
the pie chart tells you: "Chance of 
w inning Rl OO is 90%". 
Right 
0.1nceofwr,""'9ROis ! O,;. 
0,1r,ceof .. o,nr,gR\00,s9(),;. 
Choices 
Now, suppose that you prefer the Left lottery in the example below. 
To choose the Left lottery just click the button saying "Select Left". 
This is what the display w ill then look li ke if you choose the Left lottery. 
You can then click the button saying "Confirm" to move on to the next 
screen w ith a new pair of lotteries. 









Suppose instead t hat you prefer the Right lottery in the example below. 
To choose the Right lottery just click the button saying "Select Right". 
This is what the display will look like if you choose the Right lottery. 
You can then dick the button saying "Confirm" to move on to the next 
screen with a new pair of lotteries. 








First, you will select one of the lottery pairs from this task by rolling 
a 4-sided dice and then a 10-sided dice. 
You will roll the 4-sided dice to select 10 lottery pairs. 
If the dice lands on 1, you will se lect lottery pairs 1-10; if the dice 
lands on 2, you will select lottery pairs 11-20; if the dice lands on 3, 
you will select lottery pairs 21-30; and if the dice lands on 4, you 
will select lottery pairs 31-40. 
You will then roll the 10-sided dice to select one lottery pair from 
this set of 10 pairs. 
For example, if the 4-sided dice lands on 3, you will se lect lottery 
pairs 21-30. 
Jf you then roll a 7 on the 10-sided dice, you will select lottery pair 
27. 
Once you have selected the lottery pair, we will look at the choice 
that you made: the Left lottery or the Right lottery. 
We wi ll then determine your winn ings from this lottery by rolling 
two 10-sided dice, as explained earlier. 
Let's see what this means for the example we looked at earlier. 
Payment 
If you roll a number between 21 and 80 you w ill win RlOO. Thus, you have a 60% 
chance of winning RlOO. 
Fina l ly, if you roll a number between 81 and 100 you will win R200. Thus, you have 
a 20% chance of winning R200. 
Suppose you roll the two 10-sided dice and one 10-sided dice lands on 60 while 
the other 10-sided dice lands on 7. 
Then we will select number 67. 
Because 67 is between 21 and 80, you will win RlOO. 
Left 
a.onc.o/.._RO•ro'l<o(Do<e ! to20) 
a.onc.ol..._Rl00•6<Mlo(Oooe21<o90) 
Olon«eol"~ "9R200,s20 (Oooetl to 100) 
Right 
a.onc.o1 ......... •0•lO'!lo 
a.onc.o1..._•,oo•-
Total Number of Choices 
You will need to make 40 choices across 40 screens. 
On each screen there is a different lottery pair and 
you will need to choose either the Left lottery or the 
Right lottery. 
The Rand amounts under the lotteries change on 
each screen. 
In addition, the chances of winning the Rand 
amounts change for each lottery on each sc reen. 
So please pay ca reful attention when making each 
choice. 
At the end of the session today we will determine 
your earnings for this task in the following way. 
Payment 
Suppose that the lottery pair w e looked at earlier gets selected for pa yment 
when you roll the 4-sided dice and then the 10-sided dice. 
And suppose that you chose the Left lottery on this screen. 
For the Left lottery there is a 20% chance of w inning RO, a 60% chance of w inning 
RlOO, and a 20% chance of winning R200. 
You w ill now rol l two 10-sided dice to determine your earnings. 
As you can see on the screen, if you roll a number between 1 and 20, you w ill 
win RO. Thus, you have a 20% chance of winning RO. 
Left 
0-00olw ....... RO•ro'l<o(Oooelto20) 
a..-o1..._R100•60'!lo(Oooe1!1 90) 
Right 
O-OOolw ....... RO•tO'!lo 
0.-•ol- "9R 100•-
Payment 
Thus, payment for this task is determined by three 
things: 
1. Th e lottery pair that is chosen to be played out using the 
4-sided dice and the 10-sided dice. 
2. Your choice of the Left lottery or the Right lottery in each 
pair. 
3. The outcome of that lottery w hen you roll the two 10-
sided dice. 
All winnings w ill be paid in cash at the end of 
today's session. 
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